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A Response to Professor Menell:  A Remix Compulsory License 
Is Not Justified 
by Dina LaPolt,* Jay Rosenthal** & John Meller* 
INTRODUCTION 
At the recent Columbia Law School Kernochan Center Symposium Creation Is 
Not Its Own Reward:  Making Copyright Work for Authors and Performers, a 
diverse group of creators, academics, lobbyists and practicing attorneys presented 
their views on how copyright law succeeds or fails in providing the creators of 
copyrighted works with appropriate rights and protections in the ever-changing 
digital copyright ecosystem.  Speakers disagreed not only on whether or not the 
copyright system was working in favor of or against the interests of creators, but 
also on fundamental copyright principles.  This is not surprising; while most 
academics and practitioners seem to accept, to one extent or another, that creators 
are not treated well in the digital age, there is no consensus on the 200-year-old 
constitutional threshold question:  should copyright be viewed as a property interest 
or an economic theory?  If a property interest, then copyright might actually work 
better for authors and performers in the future.  But if an economic theory, the 
chance for authors and performers to thrive and prosper in the digital era decreases 
dramatically. 
As part of this debate, Jay Rosenthal, one of the authors of this Article, proposed 
that the basic problem for creators in the digital age is that in the United States, the 
majority view regarding the fundamental philosophical basis of copyright is 
grounded in an economic theory-based approach rather than a property interest-
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based approach.  Mr. Rosenthal argued that the latter should be the proper 
constitutional view of copyright.  And until a more property interest-based 
approach is systemically adopted and incorporated into U.S. copyright doctrine, 
creators will continue to have their works exploited at well below market rates, 
used without permission when permission should be required and pirated almost at 
will.  This inevitably results in the constant devaluation of the creator’s property 
interest, and represents the greatest threat to the professional class of authors in the 
United States. 
Mr. Rosenthal suggests that a strong property interest approach is warranted, 
and the proper methodology to use when developing and administering copyright 
law is to start from the basic foundational premise that all intangible copyrighted 
works should be legally characterized as property, with very little variance from the 
way the law treats real property.  But as with real property, exceptions and waivers 
of copyright (such as a limited term, fair use and compulsory licenses) are 
appropriate at times and should be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
This approach to copyright—one could call it a unified theory of copyright—is 
best constructed by Harvard Law Professor Robert Merges in his book Justifying 
Intellectual Property.1  Professor Merges argues that strong IP protection, including 
the initial treatment of copyright as a strong property interest, is still the best policy 
in the digital age, despite the ease with which the Internet allows tech companies 
and the public to ignore IP rights.2  He concludes that strong IP protection 
encourages and facilitates openness without mandating a single approach, and 
allows collective works to develop without undermining the ideal conditions for 
individual creativity.3  Professor Merges states in his book: 
[T]he traditional virtues of individual property ownership—autonomy, 
decentralization, flexibility—are in no way obsolete in the digital era; they are indeed 
just as prominent as ever.  Even though we are surrounded by dynamic new 
technologies for creating and disseminating original works, individual control over 
individual assets, in the form of IP rights, still makes sense, and for the same reasons 
as always.  IP rights reward and recognize individual achievement, and bring with 
them greater scope for individual autonomy.  They permit individual decisions about 
how creative works may be used, and by whom.  IP rights provide a fair and 
legitimate institutional setting for creativity in the digital era.4 
Professor Merges does not believe that the copyright property interest is inviolate.  
Exemptions and waivers of copyright are appropriate and should be considered.  He 
calls these secondary issues “midlevel principles.”5  These midlevel principles 
could include fair use, copyright term, the primacy of the public domain and 
arguably even piracy.  So the proper analytical approach to copyright is to start by 
recognizing a strong property interest, then proceed to analyze, debate and perhaps 
even apply the “midlevel principles” in a way that respects the property interest of 
 
 1. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). 
 2. See id. at 4–5. 
 3. See id. at 227–28. 
 4. Id. at 238. 
 5. See id. at 139. 
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the creator while simultaneously taking into consideration the interests of the users 
and the general public.6  The goal with this type of approach is to ensure that any 
limitation on the copyright property interest of the creator is properly justified.7  In 
some instances, applying a copyright exception or waiver is justified—in others it 
is not.  For example, certain compulsory licenses might be more justified than 
others.8 
This perspective is in contrast to the economic theory approach, which would 
start from an equibalance of interests between the copyright owner and user.9  
When starting from equibalance, for example, much greater weight would be given 
to factors such as efficiency and certainty, when trying to determine the 
justification for the existence, continuation or expansion of a compulsory license. 
In this short Article, we will try to provide an example of how this property 
interest approach might be applied when addressing one of the more controversial 
recent copyright reform proposals—the creation of a compulsory license for 
remixes, mash-ups and digital sampling. 
Professor Peter Menell, in his recent law review article on copyright reform, 
offers up a comprehensive approach to copyright reform with many suggestions 
and ideas, including an expansion of the scope of the music compulsory license to 
include music used in remixes, mash-ups and digital sampling.10  Professor Menell 
is a well-respected academic and some of the proposals in his article have great 
merit.  However, we believe this compulsory license proposal simply is not 
justified and would do great damage to the value of the creator’s property, 
especially when analyzed in the context of the Merges  approach. 
In his article, Professor Menell contends that a compulsory license for these 
types of works “offers an attractive solution for all parties. . . .  [I]t could offer a 
sweet spot in which copyright owners, remix artists and fans could participate in a 
market-based system for more fairly allocating value among creators.”11  While 
Professor Menell’s proposal is well intentioned and thoughtful, his conclusion is 
deeply flawed, because as we view the property interest of the original artist in 
relation to the interest of the appropriating artist, there is simply no legal, economic 
or creative justification for creating such a compulsory license. 
Applying the Merges approach, we start with the premise that all performers and 
writers of pre-existing music enjoy a strong property interest.  This universe of 
performers and writers ostensibly includes major artists and writers, as well as up 
and coming artists and writers.  The next step in the analysis is to determine 
whether the creation of a compulsory license is justified, and this would be done by 
addressing some of the perceived “midlevel principles” that may negatively impact 
 
 6. See id. at 139–41. 
 7. Id. at 4–9. 
 8. See id. at 228–29. 
 9. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
 10. Peter S. Menell, This American Copyright Life:  Reflections on Re-Equilibrating Copyright 
for the Internet Age, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235 (2014). 
 11. Id. at 355–56. 
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the property interest of the creator, but would at the same time help the 
appropriating user of the work.  There are three distinct identifiable “principles” or 
issues that could stand out as the most important to address when determining 
whether there is justification for adopting this type of a compulsory license: 
1.  A compulsory license, on its face, eliminates a creator’s right of 
approval—the right to say “no.”  This is one of the most important property 
rights a creator retains, and a high standard should be applied to justify such a 
property right deprivation. 
2.  Compulsory licenses undervalue creators’ works because compulsory 
license rates are almost invariably below free market rates. 
3.  Compulsory licenses should only be used in the event there is a market 
failure, and in this instance, there is actually a fully functioning market for 
digital samples and similar forms of free market derivative work licensing.  
In this context one would also consider the efficiency gained and the 
certainty of the user of the copyrighted work. 
I.  THE RIGHT TO SAY NO 
As a preliminary matter, Professor Menell, in an article he wrote in 2007, argues 
that copyright is not a property interest.  In his article, Intellectual Property and the 
Property Rights Movement, he attempts to provide some form of legal rationale and 
reasoning for this controversial position.12  While he acknowledges that music 
creators’ exclusive rights are important, he does not grant creators of intangible 
property right interests the same type of deference he would give to owners of real 
property.13  And he supports this conclusion by arguing, as a matter of public 
policy, that it would not be in the best interest of authors, users or the public to do 
so.  The benefits to society—including to users of copyrights—would be so 
negatively impacted that there is no rational reason for such treatment.  He also 
claims that the efficiencies gained by sometimes depriving the creators of their 
right to say “no” overrides any downside to the creators.14  This does not mean he 
believes creators have no rights—rather, it is a matter of degree.  Professor Menell 
simply believes there is little damage in curtailing a creator’s right to say “no.” 
Of primary importance to Professor Menell’s view is that depriving the creator’s 
right to say “no” by use of a compulsory license might ensure a desirable level of 
market efficiency and certainty in the price.  On this point, we believe there is 
another valid perspective—although we recognize that Professor Menell’s point has 
been adopted by the majority of tech industry and consumer stakeholders, as well 
as many academics over the last twenty years.  We argue, however, to the contrary, 
that denying a copyright owner the right to say “no” breeds inefficiency, is 
damaging to the economy as a whole and is contrary to achieving “progress” as a 
constitutional matter.  While a compulsory license is efficient for some parties, it is 
not for the rights holder, resulting in an overall loss of efficiency. 
 
 12. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, Fall 
2007, 36–42. 
 13. Id. at 39.  
 14. Id. 
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Voluntary transactions with well-defined property rights are a precondition for 
effectively functioning markets, because in voluntary transactions, both parties 
expect to be made better.  A very important recent legal/economic study turns the 
Menell concern on its head.  This study posits that a system that does not require 
consent can lead to market failure because of the externalities it generates.15  The 
authors of the study apply the Pareto efficiency test, which stands for the 
proposition that a transaction is efficient if one party is made better off without 
making another party worse off.16  In contrast, a compulsory license would 
mandate parasitic transfers, meaning the unauthorized remixer is made better off 
while the original creator is worse off.17  These types of parasitic transfers decrease 
society’s overall wealth, and the law should try to minimize the total harm caused 
by such transactions. 
Professor Merges addresses this issue by explaining that a compulsory license 
benefits the “amateur” creator at the expense of the “professional.”18  It allows 
amateur works to flourish because giving lower-profile creators free reign to use 
established works as the building blocks for their own works gives them a big 
advantage when it comes to public recognition and acceptance of their works.19  
But this advantage is at the expense of established creators, to whom approval 
rights are extremely important and whose property is consistently undervalued in 
the process.20  For those creators on the cusp of “professional” status, a compulsory 
license could prevent them from reaching that elite status because of the loss of 
revenue compared to the current, permission-based system.21 
Furthermore, the substantial costs it would require to develop and administer a 
compulsory license would constitute an unjustifiable and inefficient use of 
government and private market resources.  For example, the § 115 compulsory 
license requires costly Copyright Royalty Board proceedings to determine rates, 
costly rulemaking procedures (the most recent rules regarding § 115 Statements of 
Account were released after many years of deliberation), costly enforcement and 
costly compliance requirements.22  There is no justification for even considering 
subjecting performers and writers to a similar situation for remixes in an attempt to 
 
 15. Robert Ashcroft & George Barker, Is Copyright Law Fit for Purpose in the Internet Era?, IE-
FORUM.NL (Sept. 2014), http://perma.cc/SQQ7-ZBMB; see also Susan Butler, The Value of No, MUSIC 
CONFIDENTIAL, Sept. 2014.   
 16. Ashcroft & Barker, supra note 15, at 5. 
 17. Id. 
 18. MERGES, supra note 1, at 248. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. at 225, 248; see also id. at 56–58. 
 21. See id. at 248. 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012); Dina LaPolt, Re:  Music Licensing Study:  Notice and Request 
for Public Comment, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, MUSIC LICENSING STUDY:  COMMENTS IN RESPONSE 
TO THE MARCH 17, 2014 NOTICE OF INQUIRY DUE ON MAY 23, 2014 (2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/3P4Q-5HHN; see also Jay Rosenthal & Christos P. Badavas, Comments of the National 
Music Publishers’ Association, Inc. and the Harry Fox Agency, Inc. in Response to March 17, 2014 
Notice of Inquiry, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, MUSIC LICENSING STUDY:  COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO 
THE MARCH 17, 2014 NOTICE OF INQUIRY DUE ON MAY 23, 2014 (2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/2WUY-VSMS. 
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solve a problem that arguably does not exist. 
II.  DEVALUATION OF THE COPYRIGHT 
Professor Menell proposes a compulsory royalty rate of 18.2 cents per 
reproduction for a song five minutes long or less, or twice the current statutory 
mechanical license rate.23  This rate, or any other rate that the government would 
impose, would significantly decrease the value of the original property used in the 
derivative works.  Furthermore, it would be incredibly hard—if not impossible—
for the government to set a rate reflecting the fair market value of the works, 
considering the varied types of uses such a license would encompass.  Furthermore, 
the government arguably does not have a sophisticated understanding of the music 
business and would have great difficulty trying to determine a fair market rate. 
It is fair to conclude that creators would lose significant value through such a 
compulsory system.  A clear example of how compulsory licenses historically 
undervalue creators’ works is the § 115 compulsory mechanical license.  The 
license rate started in 1909 at two cents per reproduction for a song five minutes 
long or less.24  This is the equivalent of more than 50 cents today; however, the 
current statutory rate is a meager 9.1 cents.25  Arguably, songwriters and music 
publishers would have been able to obtain much more favorable rates through free 
market negotiations.26 
In addition to the negative impact a compulsory remix license would have on the 
value of creators’ works, this proposed compulsory license regime would neutralize 
the creators’ exclusive right to prepare derivative works, one of the most 
fundamental rights granted to authors under the Copyright Act.27 
There are also constitutional concerns.  A new compulsory license would render 
this aspect of the exclusive right entirely obsolete.  Turning this pre-existing 
exclusive right into a nonexclusive right might raise constitutional objections 
because Congress has interpreted these exclusive rights to include control over 
derivatives.  It is unclear whether Congress has the constitutional authority to 
abridge this right. 
The implementation of a compulsory license for remixes might also arguably 
violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it would so 
dramatically devalue the original artists’ property interest that the entire 
 
 23. Menell, supra note 10, at 356. 
 24. See Music Licensing Under Title 17 (Part I & II):  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop., and the Internet, 113th Cong. 21 (2014) (statement of David M. Israelite, President & 
Chief Executive Officer, National Music Publishers’ Association), available at http://perma.cc/46XY-
XTX7.  
 25. See id.  
 26. See Rosenthal & Badavas, supra note 22; see also Jay Rosenthal & Christos P. Badavas, 
Additional Comments of the National Music Publishers’ Association, Inc. and the Harry Fox Agency, 
Inc. in Response to July 23, 2014 Second Notice of Inquiry, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, MUSIC 
LICENSING STUDY:  COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE JULY 23, 2014 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS DUE ON SEPT. 12, 2014 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/4QBW-NKRN. 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
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compulsory provisions and process might be ruled an unconstitutional regulatory 
taking.28  For other compulsory licenses, the rate-setter uses comparable metrics to 
set rates such as the value of licenses in the marketplace.  There is already a 
marketplace for licensing derivative works, but license rates are so diverse, and in 
some instances the value of the license so great, that a metric-based approach 
would be unworkable and certainly unfair.  Do we start with a superstar who can 
commend huge fees for derivatives, or do we start with the amateur creator who 
will give his music away for free for anyone to alter?  Because a compulsory 
license rate would have to ignore huge-dollar deals to set a one-size-fits-all amount, 
these high-value uses would only be able to recognize a fraction of their true value. 
III.  THERE IS NO MARKETPLACE FAILURE NECESSITATING A 
COMPULSORY LICENSE 
The general rule is that compulsory licensing is only used when compelled by a 
marketplace failure.  However, there is no evidence the marketplace for licensing 
remixes, mash-ups and sampling is failing.  In fact, current music industry practice 
shows that this marketplace is already functioning, and for those newer art forms—
like mash-ups—the market must be given sufficient time to fully develop, and this 
development is already underway. 
Many rights holders voluntarily enter into agreements for their works to be 
sampled or used in remixes when approached.29  Furthermore, other solutions 
already exist, such as free market remix or a Creative Commons type collective, 
where creators voluntarily release music under licenses that allow others to remix 
their works.  There have also been several well-documented instances of 
collaborations between original artists and appropriating artists to create derivative 
works.30  Copyright law should promote these productive free market mutual 
 
 28. See Eva E. Subotnik & June M. Besek, Constitutional Obstacles?  Reconsidering Copyright 
Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 37 COLUM. J.L. &  ARTS 327 (2014) (conducting an analysis 
of whether a compulsory license created by § 114 might rise to the level of a constitutional taking).   
 29. See Dina LaPolt & Steven Tyler, Request for Comments on Department of Commerce’s 
Green Paper on Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, in U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, GREEN PAPER PUBLIC COMMENTS:  POST-MEETING COMMENTS (2014), available 
at http://perma.cc/9WBW-HAUW; see also Comments of National Music Publishers’ Association, 
Nashville Songwriters Association International, SESAC, Inc., Church Music Publishers Association, in 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GREEN PAPER PUBLIC COMMENTS:  PRE-MEETING COMMENTS 
(2013), available at http://perma.cc/9D22-87Z7; see also Victoria Sheckler, Reply Comments of ASCAP, 
BMI, NMPA, CMPA, NSAI, RIAA, and SESAC, in U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GREEN PAPER 
PUBLIC COMMENTS:  POST-MEETING COMMENTS (2014), available at  http://perma.cc/78J5-BZZN.  
Hip-hop music has utilized a thriving market for remixes and sampling since the very beginning of the 
genre, with the exception of a handful of works that were released before seeking permission from rights 
holders was commonplace.  Dina LaPolt, a co-author of this Article, participated in countless sample 
clearance negotiations when she represented the estate of Tupac Shakur and helped release his many 
posthumous albums.  Sampling is still extremely prevalent in hip-hop music and is one the genre’s 
defining hallmarks.   
 30. One famous example saw legendary hip-hop group Run-D.M.C. collaborating with Aerosmith 
on a version of the latter’s hit song “Walk This Way” for a genre-bending smash hit that broke down the 
barriers between rock music and hip-hop in 1986.  See LaPolt & Tyler, supra note 29, at 6. 
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collaborations as a matter of public policy. 
There is currently no shortage of remixes or works that can be remixed.  A good 
amount of content is available for free, and no particular work is necessary for a 
remixer to practice his or her craft (or hobby).  On the other hand, a creator who is 
forced to make his or her works available loses the essential right to say “no,” 
which denies the market a chance to ever develop.  Balancing these concerns, it is 
clear that we cannot bastardize creators’ original works to facilitate remixers’ 
access to any and all materials.  The original artists’ interests are simply greater 
than the appropriating artists’ interests. 
Because there is no compulsory remix license, the licensing transactions for 
these types of uses are worked out in the free marketplace.  In some instances, a 
derivative work is authorized, but in others not.  In the electronic music space, for 
example, one of the main musical genre utilizing remixes, the standard business 
model usually contemplates these works as works made for hire for the original 
artists.  A remixer is paid a flat fee, usually does not receive royalties and most 
certainly does not receive a copyright percentage in the remixed work.  Essentially, 
industry custom does not deem these remixes to be “derivative works” in the first 
place.31  In other instances, they do—but in both it is determined by free market 
exigencies, not compulsory license mandates. 
Similarly, a compulsory license determining remixes are per se fair use would 
most assuredly stifle marketplace growth, as much or more than any compulsory 
system providing for a below fair market rate.  The best approach, in this instance, 
would be to deny adoption of any fair use defense for mash-ups.  This will give 
markets a reasonable opportunity to form.  If markets do take shape, creators are 
suitably paid for the use of their works, while granting fair use from the start denies 
the market a chance to develop rates that would properly compensate a professional 
class of creators.  As stated succinctly by Professor Merges: 
An across-the-board declaration that remixing is fair use will shut down a nascent 
market, eliminate a potential revenue source for original creators, and therefore 
marginally reduce the scope of autonomy for creators of works in digital form.32 
It would not be appropriate for a court to make a determination that remixes are per 
se fair use in the first place.  The fourth factor of fair use, which has always been 
one of the most important to the courts, is “the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”33  In other words, this factor asks 
whether a use ignores an existing market to the detriment of the copyright owner.  
In the case of a compulsory license for remixes, there is an existing market, and fair 
 
 31. This is illustrated by the recently announced 5 Years of mau5 compilation featuring remixes 
of songs originally released by electronic artist deadmau5 that he commissioned himself.  Ryan 
Middleton, Deadmau5 Releases ‘5 Years Of Mau5’ EP Featuring Eric Prydz, Dillon Francis & Others 
[REVIEW], MUSIC TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://perma.cc/7LVE-GXWB.  The album is a 
career retrospective with remixes by many of the current hottest electronic artists, including Dillon 
Francis, Eric Prydz and Botnek.  Id.   
 32. MERGES, supra note 1, at 254. 
 33. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012); see, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
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use is just trying to weave around it.  And while the question of whether this type 
of use is transformative is beyond the scope of this Article, the authors strongly 
believe that the uses of sound recordings and musical compositions in this context 
are derivative in nature, not transformative, thus requiring licenses. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Applying the approach adopted by Professor Merges, we conclude there is no 
persuasive legal or economic justification to take the drastic step of implementing a 
compulsory license for remixes, mash-ups and sampling. 
The proper approach is to maintain the current free market system currently in 
place, while promoting the development of a market for the new uses that are the 
focus of Professor Menell’s proposal.  Compulsory licensing should only be used in 
light of a marketplace failure, and Professor Menell has not made the case that the 
marketplace has failed or that there is any justification for this new compulsory 
license. 
A functioning marketplace for digital samples already exists, and a vibrant 
marketplace for “mash-ups” may be just on the horizon.  By maintaining a creator’s 
right to say “no” to derivative uses of their works, music creators’ essential 
property rights will be enhanced.  Remixers and other appropriating artists can 
today take advantage of pre-existing business models and solutions, such as 
licensing through a creative commons-style service and the wealth of works whose 
owners voluntarily license them for derivative works, or they could simply enter 
into a license with the creator. 
For Professor Menell to support a remix compulsory license, he must minimize 
almost all arguments in favor of providing a viable property interest to authors.  In 
other words, the only way he can justify a compulsory license is to ignore or 
diminish the property rights and importance of music creators to the point where 
the user of a work and the public are considered much more important.  This 
conclusion is much harder to reach if one starts with the premise that original artists 
own a strong property interest in their works.  It can only be reached if the property 
interest is minimized, ignored or part of an economic theory that provides an equal 
balance between copyright owners and users.  Significantly, a number of major 
artists like Steven Tyler, Don Henley and Dr. Dre have already publicly opposed 
such a compulsory license, and this most assuredly will continue.34 
The argument that a strong need for this compulsory license even exists is also 
highly questionable.  Professor Menell provides no empirical evidence that there is 
any real demand by professional artists for such a right.  Rather, it seems Professor 
Menell is responding to some sort of perceived need by amateurs—not so much for 
the amateurs to create “quality” new works of art, but rather a need for these 
amateurs to simply be entertained.  There is nothing in the Copyright Law or in any 
 
 34. Ed Christman, Proposal for Compulsory Remix License Has Foes in Steven Tyler and 
Attorney Dina LaPolt, BILLBOARD (Feb. 10, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/CD76-FJ6T; see LaPolt 
& Tyler, supra note 29. 
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understanding of the word “Progress” in the Constitution35 which compels an 
original artist to provide his property at bargain basement prices—or for free—for 
the mere entertainment of users.  As a society, we do not subsidize leisure activity.  
If someone wants to have fun by creating “mash-ups,” then let that person find a 
vendor who will provide them with all the digital files he or she needs either for 
free—like in a creative commons system—or for a fee. 
Simply put, there is no persuasive justification for relieving a phantom demand 
for compulsory remix/mash-up licensing by further eroding the creators’ property 
rights.  It is our hope that we can put this issue aside so stakeholders can move on 
to real and more important issues facing the music industry. 
 
 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
